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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the First Amendment prevent Congress from enacting a content-based speech 
restriction that criminalizes non-obscene, sexual depictions of persons who are not real 
children?
2. Does the CPPA criminalize an intolerable amount of constitutionally protected speech so 
as to warrant severing those sections that tread impermissibly on First Amendment 
rights?
3. Are the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” so vague as to make a 
person guess about what conduct is prohibited and encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement of the Act?
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 2001
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 
Petitioner,
-against-
THE FREE SPEECH COALITION, ET AL., 
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Coiul of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198 
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The statute relevant to the disposition of this case, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) is set 
forth in Appendix A.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute is reviewed de novo. See 
Crawford v. Lungren. 96 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, Respondent, The Free Speech Coalition, et al., filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against Petitioner (“the Govemmenf *) by a pre-enforcement challenge to 
§ 2256(8)(B) and (D) of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”). (J. A. 1.) On 
August 12,1997, the district court determined the CPPA constitutional and granted the 
Government’s summary judgment motion. (J.A. 85.) The Free Speech Coalition appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on August 13, 1997. (J.A. 87.) The Ninth 
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, finding that Congress had established no 
compelling interest served by the content-specific speech restriction and that the Act was both 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Free Speech Coalition, v. Reno. 198 F.3d 1083, 
1095,1097 (9th Cir. 1999). The Government petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en 
banc, which it denied on July 19, 2000. The Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 220 F.3d 1113 (9th 
Cir. 2000). This Court granted the Government’s petition for certiorari on January 22,2001. 
Holder, et al. v. The Free Speech Coalition 121 S.Ct. 876 (2001).
Statement of the Facts
Over the past twenty five years, Congress has attempted to enact laws to facilitate the 
prosecution of persons engaged in the creation, distribution, and possession of sexually explicit 
images made through the exploitation of children. The CPPA expanded upon existing child
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pornography laws, largely to combat the use of computer technology to produce artificial, sexual 
images of individuals that resemble children. (J.A. 30.) The Act criminalized the production of 
images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D). This statutory language reflected a substantial shift fi'om 
defining child pornography in terms of actual harm inflicted on child participants to a more 
comprehensive definition which targeted the perceived negative effects of simulated or fictional 
child pornography. (J.A. 39.)
Respondent, The Free Speech Coalition, is a trade association of businesses involved in 
the “production, distribution, sale and presentation of non-obscene, adult-oriented materials.” 
(J.A. 2,3.) Joining the Free Speech Coalition in its facial opposition to sections 2256(8)(B) and 
(D) of the CPPA are Bold Type, Inc., the publisher of a book “dedicated to the education and 
expression of the ideals and philosophy associated with nudism;” Jim Gingerich, a New York 
artist whose paintings include landscapes and large-scale nudes; and Ron Raffaelli, a 
professional photographer whose works include nude and erotic photographs. (J.A. 3.) The 
actors and models depicted in Respondents* art are, and always have been, over the age of 
eighteen. (J.A. 18, 20, 21, 23.) Nonetheless, out of fear of being prosecuted under the CPPA, 
Respondents have refrained fi-om producing or distributing images that may appear to some 
members of the adult conununity to be minors; it is this unguided self-censorship which formed 
the basis of Respondents* complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. (J.A. 18,20,21,23.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The CPPA criminalizes the production of images which “appear to be*’ or “convey the 
impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. As such, the Act prohibits a type of 
expression protected by the First Amendment, namely, sexual, non-obscene depictions of
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individuals who are not real children. This Court has excluded child pornography and obscene 
speech from traditional First Amendment protection. However, the CPPA impermissibly targets 
non-obscene, childless depictions of both youthful-looking adults and fictional or simulated 
images that resemble children. Because this Court’s rationale for excluding child pornography 
from First Amendment coverage has been the prevention of the exploitative use of children, 
Congress is not free to regulate childless pornography based on its content. The justification for 
placing child pornography outside the ambit of the First Amendment is undermined when no 
children are utilized in the production of non-obscene, sexual images.
The CPPA is a content-specific statute, as it targets child pornography because of its 
objectionable content and bans it, thereby chilling an entire category of speech. As a content- 
specific speech restriction, the Act fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to 
advance the compelling governmental interest of protecting children from physical and 
psychological harm. As a complete ban on speech, the Act’s scope is not reasonably restricted tCi 
an identifiable evil which Congress may legitimately target. Congress is forbidden from 
regulating a person’s thoughts merely because they are perceived as distasteful; the moral 
judgments of an aggressive legislature, without the support of a legitimate, child-protective 
rationale, cannot and should not justify the governmental intervention into private impressions.
Because the CPPA prohibits more protected expression than is necessary to prevent the 
sexually exploitative use of children, it is unconstitutionally overbroad. The Act sweeps within 
its condemnation speech which the First Amendment has immunized from governmental 
regulation. The threat of unlawful application of the Act is both real and substantial; numerous 
artists and producers have refrained from creation and distribution of images which may 
resemble children because they fear severe criminal sanctions under the CPPA.
4
Moreover, the CPPA is unconstitutionally vague, violating Fifth Amendment due process 
rights. The statutory language “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” fails to define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that an ordinary person could understand what 
conduct is prohibited. The language is so vague that both creators and viewers of erotic art will 
refrain from engaging in lawful activity out of fear that potential criminal liability may hinge on 
the subjective interpretations of another person. Furthermore, the CPPA encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. The Act gives law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and 
juries broad discretion to assign criminal liability based on subjective impressions.
ARGUMENT
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS NON-OBSCENE, SEXUAL DEPICTIONS 
OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT REAL CHILDREN.
The United States Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no law abridging the 
freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. I. The protection of generally disfavored and often 
morally objectionable speech is a cardinal principal of the First Amendment; the marketplace of 
ideas thrives upon the constitutional guarantee of free expression. Although this Court has 
afforded child pornography limited constitutional protection, by expanding the definition of child 
pornography to include images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, Congress criminalized a type of expression protected by 
the First Amendment. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D). Congress maintains an indisputable interest 
in punishing those who would physically and psychologically harm children but, by 
criminalizing the production of images which depict no actual children. Congress has abused the 
legislative discretion afforded by this Court to regulate child pornography. As a content-based 
suppression of speech, the Act is not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling governmental 
interest of preventing the sexually exploitative use of real children. As such, it cannot withstand
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strict scrutiny. Therefore, this Court should declare the Act facially violative of the First 
Amendment, and sever sections 2256(8)(B) and (D), rendering the Act otherwise enforceable.
A. The Act Restricts a Type of Expression Protected bv the First Amendment.
With the enactment of the CPPA, Congress sought to establish an entirely new category 
of unprotected speech; the Act criminalizes the production of non-obscene, sexual depictions of 
individuals who are not real children. Although child pornography does not enjoy First 
Amendment protection, sexual images that are neither obscene nor depict actual children should 
not be subject to this categorical exclusion. The First Amendment recognizes a difference 
between fictional or “childless,” child pornography and actual child pornography. As the Act 
pumshes not only those who would exploit children, but those who are interested merely in the 
production of sexually-oriented images of persons that resemble minors, it punishes a type of 
expression that this Court has traditionally afforded First Amendment protection ... non- 
obscene, adult pornography.
1* The First Amendment protects “childless.” child pornography because its
production does not require the exploitative participation of real children.
In N.Y. v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982), this Court denied child pornography First 
Amendment protection because of the “State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of a minor.’” (quoting Globe Newsp. Co. v. Super. Ct.. 457 U.S. 596, 
607 (1982)). The New York statute at issue in Ferber prohibited the “use of a child in a sexual 
performance'^ 458 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added). The Court held that statutes criminalizing 
child pornography must limit the offense to “works that visually depict sexual conduct by 
children below a specified age.” Id, at 764. Because the statute criminalized the “use” of real 
children in sexual “performances,” this Court could be certain that it was upholding a law which 
was aimed at the “prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children.” Id. at 757. The
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Ferber Court further limited the scope of its decision by recognizing that in situations where “a 
person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger” or a “simulation” of a minor was 
depicted, such images would enjoy constitutional protection. Id at 763. In order to protect 
children from the physical and psychological abuse inherent in compelled sexual performance, 
this Court placed child pornography outside the ambit of First Amendment protection. 
Nonetheless, as the Ninth Circuit correctly noted, “[njothing in Ferber can be said to justify the 
regulation of [child pornography] other than the protection of actual children used in [it’s] 
production.” Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 198 F.3d 1083,1092 (9th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, in Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103,109 (1990), this Court upheld a statute 
outlawing the private possession of child pornography because the law was designed “to protect 
the victims of child pornography” by “destroying] a market for the exploitative use of children.” 
As in Ferber. the statute in Osborne criminalized only pornography featuring real children. Id. at 
106-7. In Osborne, this Court justified the exclusion of child pornography from First 
Amendment protection on the grounds that the statute in question protected child victims from 
participation in a type of expression that is tantamount to physical and psychological child abuse. 
Id. at 109. Therefore, the Osborne Court, like the Ferber Court, separated adult and child 
pornography for purposes of constitutional analysis, affording child pornography no First 
Amendment protection because its production requires the sexually exploitative use of real 
children.
Here, the rationale underlying this Court’s categorical exclusion of child pornography 
from First Amendment protection must be revisited, as the CPPA does much more than 
criminalize the sexual exploitation of actual child participants. By prohibiting the generation of 
images which merely “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually
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explicit conduct, the Act criminalizes a type of expression more akin to childless pornography. 
The child-protective policy rationale which supported this Court’s decisions in Ferber and 
Osbome is misplaced in the arena of fictional imaging. Sections 2256(8)(B) and (D) are entirely 
unrelated to the harmful effect of child pornography on child participants but, rather, target the 
effect of fictional imaging on the viewer. The CPPA does not require that actual children 
participate in pornographic acts for the depiction of such acts to be criminal; the mere 
“impression” of minors engaged in sexual conduct renders the viewer criminally liable. When 
this Court excluded child pornography from First Amendment protection, an entire category of 
speech was exposed to content-specific prohibition, but the type of childless pornography 
targeted by the CPPA was not within the contemplation of the Ferber and Osbome courts.
Moreover, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings that sections 
2256(8)(B) and (D) lawfully target unprotected speech is based solely on dicta from this Court’s 
decision in Osbome. U.S. v. Hilton. 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1999); IJ.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 394, 
401 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Mento. 231 F.3d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Acheson. 195 
F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999). In dicta, this Court briefly noted that pervasive regulation of 
child pornography, in addition to protecting child participants, may be desirable to prevent 
pedophiles from seducing children into sexual activity. Osbome 495 U.S. at 111. Because, in 
Osbome. this Court justified its holding under the rationale of protecting the well-being of 
children, the inclusion of an additional, periphery interest, also supported by that rationale, 
buttressed the Court’s reasoning. Nonetheless, when no actual children are used in the creation 
of pornography, all that remains is the periphery interest, which itself is not so compelling as to 
justify the blanket suppression of speech. Petitioner contends that this Court, in Osbome. 
implicitly approved the regulation of childless pornography, even though the statute in question
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only prohibited the nude depiction of actual minors. However, there is nothing in Osborne that 
suggests that this Court approved, or even contemplated, the prohibition of sexual images that 
depict no actual children. Therefore, images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of 
minors are not child pornography for purposes of the First Amendment, and thus, should be 
afforded traditional First Amendment protection.
2. The CPPA bans constitutionally protected, non-obscene. sexual images.
Because the CPPA criminalizes the production and possession of images that cannot be 
properly categorized as child pornography, the speech prohibited by the phrases “appears to be” 
and “conveys the impression” is protected by the First Amendment unless it is otherwise 
obscene. Although this Court has held that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech or press,” the CPPA prohibits non-obscene, childless pornography. Roth v. 
U.S.. 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957). By targeting images which may be wholly artificial, not because 
they appeal to a prurient interest, but rather because they resemble minors, Congress has 
criminalized constitutionally protected, non-obscene speech.
This Court has arrived at a three part test for determining whether speech is obscene, and 
thus undeserving of First Amendment protection. The three factors to be considered are 1) 
whether the average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 2) whether the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Miller v Cal.. 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). Moreover, both offensiveness and an appeal to something 
other than “normal, healthy sexual desires” are essential elements of obscene speech. Brocket! v. 
Spokane Arcades. Inc.. 472 U.S. 491. Specifically, this Court has held that prurience may be
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constitutionally defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which appeals to a 
“shameful or morbid interest in sex ” Roth. 354 U.S. at 487.
The CPPA impermissibly restricts protected speech because it extends to non-obscene, 
sexual expression. By criminalizing the production and possession of images which “appear to 
be” minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Congress has not only undermined the child- 
protective policy rationales ofFerber and Osborne, but deviated from the constitutionally 
established obscenity standard. The CPPA prohibits speech which is neither patently offensive 
nor appeals to a “shameful or morbid interest in sex.” Roth. 354 U.S. at 487. Moreover, the 
CPPA reaches material which may possess literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Therefore, the blanket prohibition of childless pornography cannot be justified on the grounds 
that such speech is per se obscene.
B. The Act is a Content-Based Restriction on Speech.
“Any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech, is 
a content-based restriction, regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.” Boos v. Barrv. 485 
U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988). Content-based regulations of speech are “presumptively invalid.” 
R.A.V. V. City of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). A law is only content-neutral if it applies 
to all speech regardless of the message; content-neutral speech restrictions are those that are 
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward v. Rock Aeainst 
Racism. 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989). If a law is directed at the impact of the speech on its viewers, 
it cannot be evaluated as a neutral time, place, or manner restriction. S^ Reno v. ACLU. 521 
U.S. 844, 868 (1997). This Court has been reluctant to recognize the constitutional validity of 
content-based speech restrictions because content discrimination “raises the specter that the
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Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints out of the marketplace.” R.A.V.. 
505 U.S. at 387 (internal citations omitted).
1. The CPPA restricts child Domo^aphv solely on the basis of its 
objectionable content.
The CPPA is a content-based restriction on speech, as it is the content of an image of a 
minor, or one who “appears to be a minor” engaged in sexual conduct which makes the 
production of that image unlawful. “The CPPA is a quintessential content-specific statute,” 
because it “expressly aims to curb a particular category of expression by singling out that type of 
expression based on its content and banning it.” Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68-69. Moreover, the 
legislative history of the CPPA clearly demonstrates that one of Congress’ principal motivations 
in enacting the statue was to regulate the effect child pornography has on its viewers. Congress 
was concerned that child pornography “whet[s] [the] appetites” and “inflames the desires” of its 
viewers. S. Rep 104-358 Sec. II (4),(10)(B). Furthermore, the enactment of the CPPA was 
supported by the notion that child pornography “poisons the minds and spirits of our youth ... 
and debases our society as a whole.” Id at Sec. IV (A); s^ also Sec. IV (B) (commenting that 
“a major part of the threat to children posed by child pornography is its effect on the viewers of 
such material”). Therefore, as the Act targets and restricts expression based solely on the 
perceived danger of its content, the CPPA is properly scrutinized as a content-based speech 
restriction.
2. The CPPA does not target the “secondary effects” of speech, but rather
unreasonably anticipates the impact of its content.
Moreover, the “secondary effects doctrine” does not render the Act content-neutral. 
Although this Court has recognized otherwise content-based statutes as content neutral when 
those laws are motivated by a desire to control the secondary effects of speech, this doctrine has
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been interpreted narrowly by this Court, and is therefore inapplicable to the facts of the present 
case. In Renton v. Playtime Theaters. Inc.. 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986), this Court held that an 
apparently content-specific statute could be analyzed as content-neutral if it was “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” In Renton, the regulation at issue was 
a city ordinance which, although applying only to a particular category of speech, adult movie 
theaters, was aimed at the secondary effects of such theaters. The ordinance was directed at the 
prevention of crime, maintenance of property values, and protection of residential 
neighborhoods. As this Court later stated in Boos, “the ordinance in Renton did not aim at the 
suppression of free speech,” as the “content of the films being shown inside the theaters was 
irrelevant and was not the target of the regulation.” 485 U.S. at 320. This Court, in Boos, 
concluded that “listeners’ reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary effects’ we referred 
to in Renton.” Id. at 321.
Here, the effects that Congress was trying to eradicate were not irrelevant to the speech 
itself, but rather part and parcel of its objectionable content. Although the CPPA reflects 
Congress* concern with the incidental effects of child pornography, these effects cannot properly 
be categorized as “secondary,” for they are the anticipated effects of the speech’s dangerous 
content. For example, the Act is not targeted at pedophilia itself, but rather at speech which, 
depending on a viewer’s reaction to such material, may or may not facilitate future sexual abuse. 
The CPPA was intended to prevent the perceived moral, social, and psychological damage 
inflicted by child pornography, thus, the objectionable content cannot be deemed irrelevant to a 
more secondary Congressional purpose. The CPPA is not a neutral time, place, or manner 
restriction, but rather the blanket suppression of an entire category of speech; the speech
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restriction was motivated by the perceived negative impact of the speech, thus the secondary 
effects doctrine does not apply.
Finally, this Court has stated that even if an area of speech, such as child pornography, 
can be regulated because of its constitutionally prescribable content, it does not mean that these 
areas are “entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content 
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84. 
Therefore, childless pornography should not be subject to the Court’s categorical exclusion of 
child pornography from First Amendment protection, as its “content” is not “distinctively 
proscribable.” What makes the content of child pornography proscribable is the exploitative use 
of children. When no real children are depicted, the content can no longer be freely regulated, 
and the general presumption against content-based speech restrictions intervenes. Therefore, 
given the content-specific nature of the CPPA, this Court should apply strict scrutiny in its facial 
analysis of the Act.
C. The CPPA Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny.
A content-based restriction on speech is subject to strict scrutiny review. Ward. 491 U.S. 
at 791. This Court uses “the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or 
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” Turner Broad. Svs. v. FCC.
512 U.S. 622,623 (1994). As such, a content-based speech restriction is presumptively invalid 
unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Boos. 485 U.S. at 321. 
Because the CPPA is not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling governmental interest of 
preventing the sexually exploitative use of real children in the generation of pornographic 
images, it does not survive strict scratiny.
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1. Hie prohibition of sexually explicit images which do not depict actual
children is not a compelling governmental interest.
a. This Court has identified the prevention of harm to child 
participants as the underlying legislative interest in criminalizing 
child pornography.
The Ferber Court expressly stated that “dejections of sexual conduct, not otherwise 
obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of 
live performances, retains First Amendment protection.” 458 U.S. at 764-65. Thus, Congress is 
not free to place content-specific speech restrictions upon the production of images which do not 
feature actual child “performances,” or direct child participation. Furthermore, the Ferber 
Court s rationale for prohibiting child pornography rested firmly upon the identifiable legislative 
interest in protecting children from the physical and psychological damage inherent in sexual 
exploitation. Similarly, this Court, in Osborne, sought to protect “child victims,” under the 
rationale that child pomographers permanently record the victim’s abuse.” 495 U.S. at 111. 
Thus, this Court has consistently upheld the pervasive regulation of child pornography in support 
of the justifiable state interest in protecting real children from tangible and immediate harm.
b. Regulating the sexual appetites of pedophiles is not a compelling 
justification for criminalizing the production of images which do 
not depict actual children.
The CPP A criminalizes the anticipated sexual responses of those who view simulated or 
fabricated, childless pornography. The Government contends that sexually explicit photos of 
persons who “appear” to be children could be used by pedophiles to lure potential victims. This 
assertion is neither supported by sufficient legislative findings, nor justified under a strict 
scrutiny test. As there is no established nexus between the viewing of fabricated images of child 
pornography and acts of sexual abuse committed by the viewer, the criminalization of such 
images is not supported by a compelling governmental interest.
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One of the justifications advanced by Congress for its prohibition of sexual images which 
“appear” to depict children is that the statute will “prevent pedophiles from using these images to 
seduce children into sexual activity, and will prevent sex crimes against children.” S. Rep 104- 
358 Sec. rV(B). Congress’ concern that fabricated pornographic images will act as a “training 
manual” or “device” for pedophiles in breaking down the “resistance and inhibitions of their 
victims” is not a compelling reason for regulating speech itself, especially as the speech does not 
encourage criminal exploitation of children. This Court has held that even speech which 
advocates criminal conduct deserves First Amendment protection provided that the 
encouragement does not rise to the level of incitement. Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444,448- 
49 (1969). Furthermore, the criminalization of speech which does not involve an actual human 
victim in its presentation targets a process of mental intermediation which Congress is not 
authorized to regulate. Although childless child pornography could conceivably be used by 
pedophiles to lure victims, the fact that speech may be later used as an instrument for criminal 
activity does not justify a blanket restriction of the speech itself. For example, visual depictions 
of violence could be used by criminals to coerce the participation of others in a criminal 
enterprise, yet the images themselves are not inherently criminal.
c. The eradication of images which are morally or aesthetically 
objectionable is not a compelling justification for the CPPA’s 
blanket speech restriction.
The First Amendment protects individuals fi'om government intrusion into their private 
thoughts and impressions. Stanley v. Ga.. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). “[I]f the First Amendment 
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, 
what books he may read or what films he may watch,” Id Moreover, the government “cannot 
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”
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Stanley. 394 U.S. at 566. Although this Court, in its post- Stanley decisions, has refused to 
extend First Amendment protection to child pornography, it has deliberately ayoided oyerruling 
Stanley, and thus the rule forbidding goyemmental regulation of priyate impressions is 
fundamentally sound. S^ Ferber. 458 U.S. at 763.
The proyisions of the Act which criminalize the production of images “which appear to 
be” or “conyey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct yiolate the rule 
adyanced in Stanley. By extending the definition of child pornography to include non-obscene, 
childless pornography. Congress, rather than protecting children, has attempted to legislate 
morality. The contested proyisions of the CPPA are targeted at the eradication of “eyil ideas” 
and, as such, do not adyance the goyemment interest which was the justification for this Court’s 
rulings in Ferber and Osborne. These proyisions do not protect child yictims, but rather infiltrate 
the mental processes of the artist and the yiewer. The mental impressions and sexual desires of 
those who create and view non-obscene, adult pornography are protected by the First 
Amendment. In evaluating the Congressional motivations underlying the enactment of the 
CPPA, this Court should continue its “longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the 
speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.” Hustler Mag.. lnc_. 
V. Falwell. 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
2. The Act is not narrowly-tailored to advance the compelling governmental
interest of preventing the exploitative use of actual children in
pornographic displays.
To satisfy the standards of strict scrutiny, a content-based restriction on speech such as 
the CPPA must not only advance a compelling governmental interest, but must also be narrowly 
tailored to attain that end. In the present case, to survive strict scrutiny. The CPPA’s 
criminalization of images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in
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sexually explicit conduct, must be the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s 
interest in combating the harms generated by child pornography. See Sable Commun. of Cal..
Inc. V. FCC. 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989). Although legislatures are “entitled to greater leeway in 
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children,” by criminalizing sexual depictions of 
persons who are not children. Congress has exposed the CPPA to the exacting standards of strict 
judicial scrutiny. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 756. Because the prohibition of images which “appear to 
be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct is not the least 
restrictive means of preventing the physical and psychological abuse of children, or destroying a 
market which capitalizes on such abuse, the CPPA does not survive strict scrutiny.
In Sable, this Court held that a statute's “denial of adult access to telephone messages 
which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access of 
minors to such messages ... [and thus] does not survive constitutional scrutiny.” 492 U.S. at 
131. The Sable Court warned that the statute in question was a quintessential example of 
"bum[ing] the house to roast the pig." Id, (quoting Butler v. Mich., 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). 
The statute was a “complete ban” and, thus, not the least restrictive means of protecting children 
from indecent telephone communications. Id, Although Congress maintains a compelling 
interest in “protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors,” the statute in Sable 
was “not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it [was] said to deal.” Id. at 126-27.
Here, sections 2256 (8)(A), (D) are not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling 
governmental interest of protecting children from sexual exploitation and corruption. Therefore, 
as in Sable, the Act is a “complete ban” and, thus not reasonably restricted to proscribable 
expression. As the Ninth Circuit correctly observed, the CPPA criminalizes the production and 
possession of “foul figments of creative technology that do not involve any human victim in their
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creation or in their presentation.” Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1093. The Act is not narrowly drawn 
to advance the compelling governmental interest of preventing the sexual abuse of child 
participants, as a person who “appears to be” a minor may not even be an actual human being; 
fictional persons, as well as yoxmg-looking adults are per se incapable of being victims of child, 
sexual abuse. In its attempt to destroy the child pornography market and facilitate prosecutions, 
Congress has cast its net too widely, capturing a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
speech.
II. THE CPPA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD AS IT PROHIBITS BOTH 
UNPROTECTED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND PROTECTED, NON-OBSCENE 
DEPICTIONS OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT REAL CHILDREN.
When a statute reaches so far as to include constitutionally protected speech, it violates
the First Amendment. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). The CPPA is
precisely such a statute because it is a complete ban of both protected and unprotected speech.
More specifically, the Act prohibits both traditional child pornography and non-obscene
depictions of individuals who are not real children. Because the Act criminalizes the production
of images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct, it impermissibly expands the scope of the CPPA to the extent that it captures so
much protected speech as to render the Act unconstitutional. The totality of constitutionally
impermissible applications of the Act justifies severing sections 2256(8)(B) and (D), so as to
prevent protected speech from being eclipsed by the unlawful sweep of an otherwise legitimate
statute.
A. The CPPA Prohibits An Intolerable Amount of Constitutionally Protected Speech- 
A statute is overbroad when it restricts an extensive amount of constitutionally protected 
speech. Hoffman Ests. v. The Flipside. Hoffinan Ests.. 455 U.S. 489. 494 ('19821. To be
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unconstitutional, a statute’s overbreadth “must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick v. Okla.. 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). 
This Court has defined substantial overbreadth as “a realistic danger that the statute will 
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the 
Court.” Members of the City Council of the City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent 466 U.S. 
789, 801 (1984).
The CPPA “criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally protected conduct,” and 
is therefore substantially overbroad. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 112. The Act punishes non-obscene, 
childless pornography that portrays youthful-looking adults and computer generated images of 
persons resembling minors, as well as realistic paintings, drawings, sculptures, and cartoons. As 
such, there is a “substantial danger” that the Act will “significantly compromise” First 
Amendment rights, as it prohibits images which are neither obscene nor involve the sexual 
exploitation of children.
1. The CPPA bans valuable speech.
In Reno v. ACLU. 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997), this Court held that the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) was overbroad because the terms “indecent” and “patently 
offensive” included large amounts of non-pomographic material that had serious educational or 
other kinds of value. This Court found that the Government was unable to carry the heavy 
burden of proving that no material of social value would be covered by the CD A. Id. at 879.
Here, the terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” implicate vast amounts of 
non-pomographic material that has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Under 
the CPPA, an erotic painting by the famed Balthus that depicts a child in what some may 
perceive to be a sexually explicit pose violates the CPPA. Similarly, acclaimed films, such as
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KIDS, Traffic, and “O”. which contain scenes that depict simulated sexual intercourse between 
actors portraying minors would fall within the broad sweep of the criminal statute. The Act’s 
reach likewise extends to a medical textbook that portrays and discusses the sexual abuse of 
children.
2. Individuals exercising their rieht to free speech are currently being restricted
by the CPPA.
The Government erroneously analogizes the CPPA to the New York statute held to be 
constitutional in Ferber. 458 U.S, at 773. Ferber and this case are inapposite because the CPPA 
has and will continue to restrict far more types of protected expression than the statute at issue in 
Ferber. There are legal forms of artistic expression currently covered under the Act that are 
being affected. Outlaw Productions, Inc., for example, an adult film company, has withheld 
adult films featuring adults who appear to be younger than 18 because they fear prosecution 
under the Act. (J.A. 17.) Bold Type, Inc., a group that educates people who are interested in 
nudism, fear prosecution for teaching people about the freeing aspects of the nudist philosophy. 
(J.A. 3.) Jim Gingerich, a well-known artist whose paintings include landscapes and large-scale 
nudes, fears the possibility of being prosecuted for a painting that portrays an adult who appears 
to be younger than 18. (J.A. 3.) Outlaw Productions, Bold Type, and Jim Gingerich, are only a 
few examples of people who are covered under the overly broad scope of the CPPA. Under the 
Act, a person who publishes a book about nudism will be placed in the same category as a person 
who sexually exploits children.
Congress voiced concerns that the overly broad language of the CPPA would include 
people who exercise the very rights that have been previously expressly protected. Senator 
Biden, for example, cautioned that “by criminalizing all visual depictions that “appear to be” 
child pornography - even if no child is ever used or harmed in its production - [the CPPA]
20
prohibits the very type of depictions that the Supreme Court has explicitly held protected.” (J.A. 
52.) Senator Biden’s concern has become a reality because constitutionally protected speech is 
being punished under the CPPA.
B. The CPPA’s Severability Clause Provides an Alternative to Finding the Entire
Statute Invalid on Overbreadth Grounds.
Although this Court has traditionally been reluctant to strike down a statute on its face 
when the statute “marginally infringes on First Amendment values,” this Court has held that 
partial invalidation of a statute is appropriate when a statute is part constitutional and part 
unconstitutional. Parker v. Lew. 417 U.S. 733,760 (1974); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades. 472 
U.S. 491, 501 (1985). “If the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is 
constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Id.
The CPPA contains a severability clause, which was specifically included to remedy the 
overbreadth that may result from Sections 2256(8)(B) and 2256)(8)(D). 18 U.S.C. 2256(9);
S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 28 (1996). Congress foresaw the potential unconstitutional overbreadth 
of the CPPA and included the severability clause in order to provide this Court with a less severe 
alternative to complete invalidation.
The unconstitutional sections of the CPPA and the constitutional sections are wholly 
independent of each other and this Court should utilize the severability clause and strike Sections 
2256(8)(B) and (D). These sections transform an otherwise lawful statute into an 
unconstitutional statute because they include images that do not depict actual children. By 
striking these two sections, this Court will cure the CPPA of its constitutional infirmities and 
enable it to serve the compelling governmental interest of protecting real children from sexual 
exploitation.
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III. THE CPPA IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS THE PHRASES “APPEARS TO BE”
AND “CONVEYS THE IMPRESSION” ARE HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE.
The Constitution provides that “no person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. V. The CPPA is void for vagueness 
because it violates the Fifth Amendment right to due process. Statutory vagueness is 
unconstitutional because vague laws: 1) do not specify what type of conduct is unlawful such 
that a person of ordinary intelligence can understand; 2) result in “arbitrary and discriminatory 
application”; and 3) have a chilling effect on the exercise of protected speech. Gravned v. City 
of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104,108-109 (1972). Sections 2256(8)(B) and (D) exemplify each of 
these concerns.
A. The CPPA Does Not Define the Criminal Offense with Sufficient Clarity Such 
That an Ordinary Person Could Understand What Is Prohibited.
A statute that forces persons of common intelligence to guess at its meaning violates the 
constitutional guarantee of due process. Connallv v. Gen. Constr. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
The phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” are highly subjective and provide no 
guidance as to what type of conduct should be avoided so as not to fall under the scope of the 
CPPA. Moreover, the Government has broad discretion to determine whether an individuaPs 
impressions are criminal.
1. The CPPA does not indicate whose perspective defines the appearance of
a minor.
The phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” are highly subjective because 
they do not specify from whose perspective the impressions are judged. An individual who is 
looking at an image has no way of knowing whether the illegality of his conduct will be 
determined solely on the basis of his own impressions or rather from the perspective of the 
distributor, or even that of law enforcement officials. Similarly, it is difficult to distinguish a
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significant difference between the terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression ” For 
example, it is unclear whether an image can be found to “appear to be a minor” even if it is not 
presented in such a way as to “convey the impression” that it is a minor. A criminal statute 
cannot rest on an uncertain foundation that leaves the threshold of what is lawful and unlawful to 
mere conjecture. Connallv. 269 U.S. at 393. A citizen should not be held criminally liable under 
a statute which is subject to significantly different constructions. Id
2. Because of its vague wording, the CPPA targets more than apparently
realistic depictions of minors.
The government contends that “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” addresses 
real children. However, the language of the statute does not specifically state that it addresses 
minors. Therefore, the CPPA does not limit its applications to realistic images of children.
Under the current construction of the statute, any image that a single individual decides to 
interpret as a child is included under the statute. Therefore, each citizen is judged according to 
the extremes of society’s interpretations, from the most conservative to the most liberal.
B. The Vague Statutory Language Encourages Arbitrary and Discriminatory
Enforcement.
In Kolender v. Lawson, this Court held that the possibility of law enforcement officials 
employing their personal beliefs poses a grave threat that must be prevented. There must be 
clear standards of application in order to prevent police, prosecutors, and juries from subjectively 
enforcing the law according to their discretion. 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). The CPPA lacks 
these clear standards of application and the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the 
impression,” give law enforcement officials the opportunity to subjectively exercise their 
discretion. No formula can accurately calculate the relationship between the actual age of a
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person and the age that a person “appears to be.” Therefore, the CPPA permits the “arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement” that this Court warned about in Kolender.
1. The reach of the CPPA is not limited to sexually explicit images that are
“virtually indistinguishable” from real children.
In the legislative history of the CPPA, Congress addressed the possibility that certain 
types of technology could be used to create images that are “virtually indistinguishable” from 
authentic photographs of actual minors engaging in such conduct. (J. A. 31.) Although such 
Congressional concerns may have motivated the enactment of the CPPA, Petitioner erroneously 
contends that Congress set a standard by which the fact-finder could determine whether an image 
falls within the scope of the statute. (J.A. 31.) The standard used by juries is not the “virtually 
distinguishable” standard and Petitioner has misconstrued the legislative history. Congress was 
merely addressing the role of computer technology and the potential for production of realistic 
computer images. However, the language of the statute encompasses both computer images as 
well as all non-computer generated images
Even assuming that the government’s contention is valid and that juries will use a 
“virtually indistinguishable” standard to determine whether an individual has violated the CPPA, 
such a standard is still highly subjective. The phrase “virtually indistinguishable” would allow 
juries to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the statute because juries are subject to the same 
influences as law enforcement. The various personalities and backgrounds of the jury members 
will result in unexpected determinations of whether the image is “virtually indistinguishable” 
from that of an actual child.
lM
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2. The scienter requirement does not remedy the violation of an individuars
due process rights.
The government erroneously contends that the CPPA’s scienter requirement saves the 
statute because it forces the government to prove that the individual acquired or distributed the 
child pornography because he believed that the sexual images were of children under 18 years 
old. However, the scienter requirement does not rectify the violation of an individual’s due 
process rights and permits the government to invade the individual’s privacy. Due Process rights 
cannot be remedied after the fact and the government will also be permitted to conduct an 
unfettered investigation of backgrounds and past histories.
3. The affirmative defense is inadequate.
The affirmative defense is inadequate because it is unavailable to those charged with 
possession and only sellers, producers, and distributors are able to use this affirmative defense. 
Therefore, an individual who possesses lawful adult pornography may be convicted of 
possession of child pornography because the affirmative defense is unavailable. Petitioner 
contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(d) provides a defense for those who are charged with 
possession of child pornography.' However, this defense is likewise inadequate for three 
reasons.
First, the defense only protects those who possessed less than three images and does not 
specify the way in which the images must have come into possession. Therefore, an individual 
who receives four e-mails containing images that “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of 
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct will be convicted of possession.
' 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d) states than an individual may avoid conviction by demonstrating that he 
(1) possessed fewer than three such images; and (2) promptly and in good faith destroyed or 
reported the images to law enforcement.
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Second, because the defense forces individuals to promptly and in good faith destroy the 
images but does not define what “promptly” means, an individual who is unaware that he has 
come into possession of images covered under the CPPA may be convicted for possession.
Third, requiring individuals to report the images to law enforcement places a heavy 
burden on civilians to run the risk that they will be unjustly branded as a viewer of child 
pornography.
Furthermore, the government’s contention that the scienter requirement and affirmative 
defense save the statute ignores the fact that due process right are triggered prior to prosecution. 
The exhaustive ordeal and negative stigma of an innocent person being known as a viewer of 
child pornography is too great and is not fixed by an affirmative defense that is triggered after 
the fact. The statute also provides no guarantees that the problem will be fixed. The 
Constitution requires that individuals be provided adequate warning and notice of what action 
will violate certain laws. Because the CPPA’s only safeguards are offered after an individual’s 
due process rights have been violated, it violates the Constitution.
C. The CPPA Has a Chilling Effect on Constitutionally Protected Speech.
The right to free speech is supremely precious. NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963). In Button, this Court addressed the strong possibility that vague laws will prevent people 
from exercising their right to free speech. Id The threat of punishment is enough to frighten 
people into surrendering their First Amendment rights. Id. at 433. When boundaries of 
forbidden areas are not clearly defined, citizens err on the side of caution and sacrifice lawfully 
permitted forms of free speech. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). In 
Reno V. ACLU. this Court held that the Communications Decency Act was void for vagueness 
because the sanctions were too extreme. 521 U.S. at 871. The CDA was a criminal statute and
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had a penalty of two years in jail. 521 U.S. at 872. Fear of invoking such criminal sanctions 
would prevent individuals from communicating lawful ideas and images. Id.
The CPPA’s criminal sanctions are far more severe than those of the CDA. Conviction 
under the CPPA is a minimum of fifteen years in prison. Thus, the chilling effect discussed in 
Reno is magnified in this case because the stakes are higher. The minimum fifteen year penalty 
will prevent large numbers of people from exercising their Constitutional right to free speech. 
Those who risk criminal sanctions in order to speak freely must defend their ideas under the 
affirmative defense.
The CPPA*s affirmative defense contravenes the Congressional intent of the First 
Amendment because it forces people to utilize their own resources. Individuals must hire 
lawyers and fight a legal battle in order to employ the affirmative defense. The CPPA forces 
individuals to satisfy a prerequisite before they can exercise their First Amendment rights. By 
doing so, the CPPA changes the First Amendment and limits its freedoms to a select few. Under 
the CPPA, only those who possess and are able to use their own resources are permitted to 
exercise their First Amendment rights. Because only certain individuals are given the right to 
speak freely, the marketplace of ideas is robbed of valuable contents.
CONCLUSION
By criminalizing the sexual depiction of adult or even artificial persons which “appear to 
be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, Congress has 
legislated in contravention of the First Amendment. No children are banned in the production or 
possession of childless pornography, and thus the child-protective policy rationale underlying the 
Ferber and Osborne decisions has been significantly undermined. Therefore, Congress is 
prevented from enacting a content-based speech restriction upon non-obscene, childless
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pornography unless the Act is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. 
Because the CPPA is not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling governmental interest of 
protecting children from physical and psychological harm, it does not survive strict scrutiny.
Furthermore, the CPPA is invalid on overbreadth grounds because it prohibits an 
intolerable amount of constitutionally protected speech. Because the scope of the Act is so 
expansive, a substantial amount of valuable speech will be deterred. Therefore, this Court 
should sever the offending provisions of the Act so as to tailor the CPPA to the identified social 
need of preventing the exploitative use of real children.
Moreover, the CPPA is void for vagueness because it fails to define the prohibited 
conduct such that a person of common intelligence can understand and encourages law 
enforcement to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the statute. The imprecise definition of 
and relationship between the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” exposes the 
Act to opposing constructions and subjective fact-finding.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and find Sections 
2256(8)(B) and (D) of the CPPA unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,^___
Counsel for Respondent
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APPENDIX A
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) defines child pornography as:
Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or 
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, 
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where -
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct;
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in 
such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual 
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
A-1
